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Abstract
This study explores the linkage between the labor force participation of the elderly
and the long-run performance of the economy in the context of a two-period-lived over-
lapping generations model. We assume that the old agents are heterogeneous in their
labor e¢ciency and they continue working if their income exceeds the pension that
can be received in the case of full retirement. We rst inspect the key factors that
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cally the long-run impact of labor participation of the elderly on capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
In the last 30 years, the labor force participation of the elderly has been increasing in many
advanced countries. For example, according to the Aging Society White Paper 2017 issued
by the Japanese Cabinet O¢ce, the labor forces share of the Japanese elderly aged 65 years
and over increased from 5.9% in 1980 to 11.8% in 2016. Currently, more than 50% of the
Japanese male elderly aged 6569 years engage in full-time- or part-time jobs. Such a trend
stems from rises in longevity and health status of the elderly as well as from changes in the
social environment that increase the activeness of the elderly. Additionally, many researchers
claim that a change in the elderlys labor supply is closely related to pension reforms. As
mentioned below, several empirical studies, which use data of various countries, conrm that
the recent rise in the labor force participation of the elderly had a statistically signicant link
to pension reforms implemented in those sampled industrialized countries after the 1990s.
In this paper, we present a model of retirement decision of the elderly that ts well to em-
pirical observations mentioned above, We also inspect the impact of a change in the retirement
decisions of the elderly on the long-run capital accumulation. To achieve those two goals in a
tractable manner, we introduce our formulation of the endogenous retirement decision of the
elderly into a standard neoclassical growth model with two-period lived overlapping genera-
tions. Based on this analytical framework, we investigate how changes in various factors that
determine the retirement decision of the elderly a¤ect the behaviors of key macroeconomic
variables in the long run.
Specically, in our model economy, the young agents are assumed to be homogeneous and
they fully devote their available time to working. However, the old agents are heterogeneous
in the sense that their labor e¢ciency di¤ers from each other. We assume that the old agents
draw their labor e¢ciency from a given distribution function at the beginning of their old
age. We also assume that there is a compulsory pay-as-you-go pension plan nanced by
taxation on the young generations income. Given this setting, each old agent compares the
expected pension revenue in the case of full retirement with the income that can be earned
from the labor force participation; this determines the agents decision to either fully retire or
participate in the labor force. Such a decision determines a cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency
the agents who have a lower e¢ciency level than the cuto¤ select full retirement, and the
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agents whose e¢ciency exceeds the cuto¤ continue working in their old age. We show that
the pension scheme set by the government as well as the rate of population aging directly
a¤ect the threshold level of labor e¢ciency, thereby determining the labor force participation
of the elderly.
The production side of the economy follows the standard neoclassical growth model.
Therefore, in the long-run equilibrium capital and income grow at an exogenously specied
population growth rate, and per capita levels of capital and income stay constant over time.
Given this setting, we analytically show that an increase in the labor force participation of
the old agents may increases the steady-state levels of per capita capital stock and the per
capita income. In addition to the theoretical discussion, we examine numerical examples to
evaluate quantitative impacts of changes in the degree of population aging and the policy
parameters on the labor force participation of the elderly and the steady-state levels of capital
and per capita income. Our numerical discussion reveals that magnitudes of those impacts
are sensitive to the shape of the distribution function of the labor e¢ciency of the old agents.
Related Literature
(i) Empirics
From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the labor force participation of the elderly declined
in many advanced countries1. Concerning this fact, Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, and 2007)
provide meticulous research outcomes. Among others, Gruber and Wise (1999) present de-
tailed empirical studies on 11 industrialized countries and reveal that an increase in the gen-
erosity of the social security plan contributed towards the international trend of the decline in
the labor force participation of old persons2. In contrast, recent studies focus on the persistent
rise in the labor force participation of the elderly since the early 1990s. For example, Oshio
et al. (2011) examine the impact of social security reforms on the labor force participation
of the Japanese elderly for 40 years (1968-2007). They nd that the labor force participation
of the elderly started increasing after the 1985 reform that reduced the generosity of social
security benets, including pension plans3. In a similar vein, Berkel et al. (2004) study the
impact of pension reforms on the retirement decision of the German elderly population, while
1A well-cited earlier empirical study on this topic is Krueger and Pischke (1992).
2Gruber and Wise (1998) summarize their main ndings.
3Higuchi et al. (2006), Shimizutani (2013), and Shimizutani and Oshio (2013) present further evidence.
3
Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Bovini (2018) discuss the e¤ect of pension reforms on the elderlys
retirement decision and wealth accumulation in Italy. Additionally, Coil (2015) presents a
useful survey on empirical studies on this topic4.
Several authors point out that health status is also important for the labor force participa-
tion of the elderly. Kalwji and Vermeulen (2008) investigate the impact of health conditions
on the labor force participation of the elderly in 11 European countries. They provide careful
estimation results and clarify the multidimensional nature of the health status of the elderly.
Overall, their results reveal that health status is one of the major factors that a¤ect the
retirement decision of the elderly. Similar studies are conducted by Mete and Schlutz (2002)
on Taiwan and Cai (2007) on Australia5.
(ii) Theory
Many authors modify Diamonds (1965) overlapping generations (OLG) model to intro-
duce the endogenous labor supply of the old agents. The most popular formulation is to
assume that young agents fully devote their available time to working, whereas old agents
make the labor-leisure choice. In this setting, an increase in the labor force participation of
the elderly means that old agents select a lower level of leisure time. A sample of this type
of formulation includes Zhang and Zhang (2009), Gon and Liu (2012), Mizuno and Yakita
(2013), and Hirazawa and Yakita (2017). Since this modeling assumes that agents are homo-
geneous, all the old agents select the same level of partial retirement that corresponds to the
length of leisure time they choose. A deciency of this formulation is that it fails to capture
the fact that in reality, a substantial number of the elderly fully retire.
On the other hand, a few authors have examined models in which the full retirement deci-
sion of the elderly is endogenously determined. Among others, Matsuyama (2008) constructs
a two-period-lived OLG model in which old agents make a discrete choice between working
and retirement by comparing utilities obtained in alternative situations. In his model, agents
in each cohort are homogeneous; this ensures that the decision regarding the choice between
working and retirement is uniform among the elderly6. Aisa et al. (2015) introduce agent
4See also Coil and Levine (2018).
5Gacía-Pèrez et al. (2013) present an empirical study on the relationship between retirement incentive,
pension, and employment status based on the Spanish data.
6Matsuyama (2008) shows that the model involves multiple steady states so that a poverty trap arises. Gon
and Liu (2012) indicate that if the model allows partial retirement, then it would imply that the steady-state
equilibrium is uniquely determined. Since the model discussed by Gon and Liu (2012) is a variant of the
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heterogeneity. In their model, each agent is endowed with a given labor e¢ciency at the
beginning of the agents life, and agents whose labor e¢ciency exceeds an endogenously de-
termined threshold level work in their old age. Although the basic idea of Aisa et al. (2015)
is similar to our model, the authors treat a two-period model, and hence the long-run ef-
fect of the old agents labor supply on capital accumulation is not discussed in their study7.
Compared to the foregoing formulations mentioned above, our model, which emphasizes the
heterogeneity of old agents, has an advantage it can simultaneously determine the full re-
tirement of some old agents as well as the aggregate level of labor force participation of the
elderly in a dynamic environment.
Concerning the link between the social security and labor force participation of the elderly,
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) present an early theoretical study. These authors explore
a microeconomic model of social insurance in the presence of endogenous retirement and
asymmetric information. In macroeconomics research, Hu (1979) conducts one of the earliest
studies on the impact of social security on the labor supply of the elderly in the context of
Diamonds (1965) OLG model. In his model, the old agents make labor-leisure choice and
they receive a pension for their leisure time. Given this setting, Hu (1979) explores the long-
run e¤ect of a pay-as-you-go pension system on capital accumulation. Hus (1979) modeling
is employed by Miyazaki (2017) who examines the optimal social insurance in the presence
of labor-leisure choice of the old agents. Cipriani (2018) also uses a similar setting to study
the macroeconomic impact of population aging8. Since the analytical frameworks used by
Hu (1979), Miyazaki (2017), and Cipriani (2018) are essentially the same as the models of
Zhang and Zhang (2009) and others mentioned above, their discussions do not depict the
full retirement decision of the elderly. Again, it is worth emphasizing that our model with
heterogenous elderly can highlight the relationship between pension schemes and the full
retirement of the elderly in a coherent manner9.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the analytical frame-
labor-leisure choice models mentioned above, it does not depict the full retirement of some of the old agents.
7 It must be pointed out that Matsuyama (2008) briey examines a modied model in which disutility levels
of labor is heterogeneous among agents; this ensures that some old agents fully retire in equilibrium. However,
he does not consider this line of formulation in detail.
8See also Phillippe and Pestieau (2013).
9Here, we focus on theoretical studies based on the two-period lived OLG models. There are several
quantitative studies on the relationship between social security programs and labor supply in the context of
calibrated multi-period lived OLG models: see, for example, Kitao (2014 and 2015).
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work for our discussion. Section 3 inspects the existence and stability of the steady-state
equilibrium of the model economy. Section 4 characterizes the relationships between the
steady-values of macroeconomic variables and the key parameters involved in the model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Households
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which each agent lives for two periods,
young and old. We assume that young agents live for one period with certainty, but they
face a probability of surviving to the old age. We denote the probability of surviving as
 2 (0; 1]: Each cohort consists of a continuum of agents, and the mass of the cohort grows
at a constant rate of n: The population of the cohort born at the beginning of the period t
is Nt; so that Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1: Since the population share of the old generation in period
t is Nt 1=(Nt + Nt 1) = = (1 +  + n) ; population aging means that a decline in the
population growth rate, n and/or a rise in the probability of surviving, :
When young agents are homogeneous and each agent inelastically supplies one unit of
hours worked. It is assumed that young agents one unit of working time provides one
unit of labor service. On the other hand, old agents are heterogeneous in the sense that
labor e¢ciencies di¤er from each other. Such a di¤erence in labor e¢ciency may stem from
di¤erences in each agents health status and the motivation for labor force participation,
among others. In this paper, we consider that the labor e¢ciency of an old agent mainly
depends on her health status. We assume that the labor e¢ciency, denoted by h; follows a
cumulative distribution function F (h) ; which satises
F 0 (h) > 0; F () = 0; F (1) = 1; 0 <  < 1:
Namely, there is a minimum level of e¢ciency of the old persons labor, ; and the most able
old agents have the same level of labor e¢ciency as that of young agents. We assume that
the distribution of h is stationary, and h is i.i.d over time as well as across agents. It is also
assumed that one unit of hours worked of an old agent with labor e¢ciency h; provides h
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unit of labor service.
Under our assumption, all the young agents born in period t earn the same amount of
wage income, wt: On the other hand, the old agents born in period t   1 who select full
retirement receive a pension, pt; whereas the agents who stay in the labor force receive
pt+1 + (1  )hwt; where ;  2 (0; 1) : This assumption means that if an old agent works,
she receives a part of the pension, pt plus the after-tax wage, (1  )hwt; where  denotes
the rate of income tax on the working old, and hwt is the competitive wage paid for an old
agent whose labor e¢ciency is h: In this formulation, we may consider that the pension for
a working old is deducted by hwt : a working old who earns a higher wage income receive
a smaller amount of pension10. For simplicity, we assume that the old agents do not make
labor-leisure choice, and labor does not yield disutility. Thus, the old agents retirement
decision is based on the comparison of incomes in alternative situations. This means that the
income of an old agent with a labor e¢ciency, h, is given by
yh;t = max fpt; pt + (1  )hwtg :
As a result, the cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency in period t+ 1 is determined by
ht =
1  
1  
pt
wt
: (1)
The old agents born in period t  1 whose labor e¢ciency is lower than ht fully retire, while
the agents whose e¢ciency exceeds ht stay in the labor force. We assume that the agents
with h = ht+1 continue working.
When setting up the lifetime optimization problem of an agent, we may use two alternative
formulations. The rst is to assume that agents draw h at the beginning of their young age. In
this case, each young agent born at the beginning of period t exactly knows her health status
when she becomes old. In such a perfect-foresight environment, the optimization problem of
the agent who draws h is to maximize the discounted sum of expected life-time utilities
Uh;t = log ch;t +  log xh;t+1 0 < ;  < 1
10Our formulaton of the pension for the old agents who stay in the labor force is close to the pension scheme
applied to the working elderly in Japan.
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subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
ch;t +
xh;t+1
(1 + rt+1)
1

= wt   t +
yh;t+1
(1 + rt+1)
1

: (2)
In the above, ch;t and xh;t+1 ,respectively, denote the type h agents consumption in the
agents young and old ages, rt+1 is the risk-free rate of real interest, t is an income tax,
and  is a given discount factor. As usual, we assume that the competitive interest rate on
nancial assets incorporates the risk involved due to the agents uncertain life time, meaning
that the gross interest rate in period t + 1 is given by (1 + rt+1) =: The budget constraint
(2) reects this assumption.
We nd that the optimal levels of consumption, ch;t and xh;t+1 and saving, sh;t; are,
respectively, given by
ch;t =
1
1 + 

wt   t +
yh;t+1
1 + rt+1

; (3)
xh;t+1 =
 (1 + rt+1)
1 + 

wt   t +
yh;t+1
1 + rt+1

; (4)
sh;t = wt   t   ch;t =

1 + 
(wt   t) 
yh;t+1
(1 + ) (1 + rt+1)
: (5)
By our assumption, the income in the old age is given by
yh;t+1 =
8<
: pt+1 : for   h < h

t+1;
pt+1 + (1  )hwt+1 for h  h

t+1:
(6)
The second formulation is to assume that agents draw h at the beginning of their old age.
In the real world, young people do not possess perfect information about their health status
when they become old. Thus, the second formulation would be more realistic than the rst
one. If this is the case, the agents are ex-ante identical at the beginning of their young age,
so that agents optimization problem is to maximize
Ut = Et [log c;t +  log xt+1] 0 < ;  < 1
subject to
ct +
xt+1
(1 + rt+1)
1

= wt   t +
yet+1
(1 + rt+1)
1

:
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Here, yet+1 is the old agents income expected in period t; which is given by
yet+1 = F
 
ht+1

pt+1 +

1  F
 
ht+1

pt+1 + (1  )
Z 1
ht+1
hwt+1dF (h) : (7)
Since Pr
 
h  ht+1

= F
 
ht+1

and Pr
 
h  ht+1

= 1   F
 
ht+1

; the rst two terms in
the right-hand side of the above is the expected amount of pension received in period t+ 1:
The third term represents the expected after-tax wage income: The optimal choice gives the
following:
ct =
1
1 + 

wt   t +
yet+1
1 + rt+1

; (8)
xt+1 =
 (1 + rt+1)
1 + 

wt   t +
yet+1
1 + rt+1

; (9)
st =

1 + 
(wt   t) 
yet+1
(1 + ) (1 + rt+1)
: (10)
It is to be noted that those two alternative formulations yield the same macroeconomic
equilibrium conditions. To see this, let us drive the average consumption of the young agents
in the rst formulation in which agents draw h at the beginning of their young age. We nd
Z 1

ch;tdF (h) =
1
1 + 

wt   t +

1 + rt+1
Z 1

yh;t+1dF (h)

;
where
Z 1

yh;t+1dF (h) =
Z ht+1

pt+1dF (h) +
Z 1
ht+1
pt+1dF (h) +
Z 1
ht+1
hwt+1dF (h)
= F
 
ht+1

pt+1 +

1  F
 
ht+1

pt+1 +
Z 1
ht+1
hwt+1dF (h) :
Therefore, in the rational expectations equilibrium, the rst and the second formulations give
the identical level of young agents average consumption. This property holds for consumption
in old age as well. Consequently, the alternative formulations establish the same macroeco-
nomic equilibrium conditions. For simplicity of exposition, we use the second formulation in
the following discussion.
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2.2 Firms
The production side of our model is the standard one. The nal good and factor markets are
competitive. There is a representative rm that produces a homogeneous good according to
the following Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1; (11)
where Yt is the output, Kt is the aggregate capital stock, and Lt is the input of labor service.
The rm employs both young- and old-workers labor services, Lyt ; and L
o
t ; respectively, so
that
Lt = L
y
t + L
o
t : (12)
Since we have assumed that one unit of hours of work of a young agent yields one unit of
labor service, Lyt also denotes the total hours of work of the young agents. We have also
assumed that one unit of hours worked provided by an old agent with the labor e¢ciency
h yields h amount of labor service. Thus, denoting hours worked of old agents with h by
lh;t the aggregate input of old workers labor service is
Lot =
Z 1
ht
hlh;tdF (h): (13)
The prot of the rm is given by
t = AK

t
 
Lyt +
Z 1
ht
hlh;tdF (h)
!1 
  rtKt   wtL
y
t  
Z 1
ht
(wth)lh;tdF (h) :
The rm maximizes prot by selecting Kt; L
y
t and lh;t; and the rst-order conditions for an
optimum are given by the following:
AK 1t L
1 
t   rt = 0; (14)
(1  )AKt L
 
t   wt = 0; (15)
h (1  )AKt L
 
t   hwt = 0 for h 2 [h

t ; 1] : (16)
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Since conditions (15) and (16) are symmetric, the total demand of labor service satises
Lt = [(1  )A]
1
 w
  1

t Kt: (17)
2.3 Government
We assume that there is a pay-as-you-go pension plan in which the tax for social security
is levied on the young agents wage income as well as on the wage income of the working
elderly. The per-capita tax on the young agents given by t = wt; where  2 (0; 1) the at
rate of payroll tax. We have also assumed that a at rate of income tax,  2 (0; 1) ; is applied
to the wage income of working old. We assume that all the tax revenue received by the
government is spent for pension, and there is no government debt. Hence, the governments
budget constraint in period t is
wtNt + Nt 1
Z 1
ht
hwtdF (h) = [F (h

t ) + (1  F (h

t ))] ptNt 1: (18)
The left-hand side of (18) is the aggregate tax revenue, and the right-hand side expresses the
aggregate pension for the elderly. It is to noted that, by our assumption, the mass of the old
agents in period t is Nt 1:
2.4 Market Equilibrium Conditions
Since we have assumed that one unit of hours worked o¤ered by a young agent yields one
unit of labor service, the total supply of young agents labor service in period t is Nt: On the
other hand, the working population of the elderly in period t is [1  F (ht )]Nt 1: and the
average labor survive of the working old is
R 1
ht
hdF (h) ; so that the aggregate labor service
provided by the old is Nt 1 [1  F (h

t )]
R 1
ht
hdF (h) : As a result, the total supply of labor
service denoted by N st is given by
N st = Nt
(
1 + [1  F (ht )]
Z 1
ht
hdF (h)

1 + n
)
: (19)
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The labor market equilibrium condition is
N st = Lt: (20)
Since only young agents save, the market equilibrium condition of asset market is
Kt+1 = Ntst: (21)
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Determinants of Labor Supply of the Elderly
To derive a complete dynamic system, we rst note that constraint (18) andNt = (1 + n)Nt 1
present
pt
wt
=


(1 + n) + 
R 1
ht
hdF (h)
(1  )F (ht ) + 
: (22)
Combining this equation with (1) leads to
ht =

1  
1  
24  (1 + n) +  R 1ht hdF (h)
(1  )F (ht ) + 
3
5 : (23)
Inspecting (23) ; we nd the following:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique, stationary cuto¤ level of h; if the following conditions
are fullled:

1  
1  
" 

(1 + n) + 
R 1

hdF (h)
(1  )F () + 
#
> ;

1  
1  

(1 + n)


< 1: (24)
Proof. Let us express
M (ht ) =

1  
1  
 

(1 + n) + 
R 1
ht
hdF (h)
(1  )F (ht ) + 
:
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Note that Z 1
ht
hdF (h) = [hF (h)]1ht
 
Z 1
ht
F (h) dh;
so that
d
dht
Z 1
ht
hdF (h) =  F (ht )  h

tF
0 (ht ) + F (h

t ) =  h

tF
0 (ht ) < 0
This means that B (ht ) monotonically decreases with h

t : It is also noted that
M () =

1  
1  
" 

(1 + n) + 
R 1

hdF (h)
(1  )F () + 
#
; M (1) =

1  
1  

(1 + n)


:
Hence, as illustrated Figure 1, under (24) ; the graphs the left-hand side of (23) (45 degree
line) and the left-hand side of of it has a unique intersection for ht 2 (; 1) :
[Figure 1]
From (23) 1, it is easy to see that the equilibrium level of ht depends only on the parameter
values involved in the model, and thus the equilibrium level of cuto¤, ht ; stays constant over
time, that is, ht = h
 for all t  0: Moreover, inspecting Figure 1 reveals that h responds to
changes in the key parameter values in the following manner:
@h
@n
> 0;
@h
@
< 0;
@h
@
> 0;
@h
@
> 0;
@h
@
< 0:
For example, population aging (a rise in  and/or a decline in n) shifts the graph of M (ht )
downward, which lowers h: Since the labor participation rate of the elderly is
1 ht
1  ; a decrease
in h means that a larger fraction of old agents stay in the labor market. Consequently, we
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The rate of labor force participation of the elderly rises with a higher longevity,
; a lower population growth rate, n; a lower payroll tax rate, ; a lower tax rate on the old
agents wage income, ; and a higher rate of pension payments for the working old, :
The intuition behind those comparative statics outcomes is easy to obtain. For example,
(22) means that a rise in  (or a decrease in n) lowers the per-capita level of pension, pt;
under given levels of h and wt: This makes the selection of full retirement less attractive for
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the elderly, and thus a larger number of the old agents want to stay in the labor force. As a
consequence, h will decline and the labor force participation rate of the elderly increases.
3.2 Existence and Stability of the Steady-State Equilibrium
In view of (10) and (21) ; we see that the aggregate capital stock per population of young
agents, kt = Kt=Nt; follows
kt+1 =
1
1 + n


1 + 
(1  )wt  

(1 + ) (1 + rt+1)
yet+1

: (25)
Here, from (7) ; yet+1 is expressed as
yet+1 = F (h
) pt+1 + [1  F (h
)]pt+1 + (1  )
Z 1
h
hwt+1dF (h) : (26)
From (1) ; the relation between pt and wt is given by
pt =
1  
1  
hwt for all t  0: (27)
Furthermore, using (17) ; (19) and (20) ; we express the labor market equilibrium condition
in the following manner:
kt = (h
)w
1

t ; (28)
where
 (h) =
(
1 + [1  F (ht )]
Z 1
ht
hdF (h)

1 + n
)
[(1  )A] 
1
 :
Combining (25) ; (26) ; and (28) ; we obtain the following:
 (h)w
1

t+1 =

(1 + n) (1 + )
(1  )wt
 

(1 + n) (1 + ) (1 + rt+1)

[(1  )F (h) + ]
1  
1  
h + (1  )
Z 1
h
hdF (h)

wt+1:
(29)
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Note that rt+1 = A (Kt=Lt)
 1 and wt = (1  )A (Kt=Lt)
  : Thus, we obtain
rt+1 = A

wt+1
(1  )A
  1 

= R (wt+1) :
This means that (29) can be written as
wt = (wt+1) ;
where
 (wt+1) =
1
(1  ) [1 +R (wt+1)]

[(1  )F (h) + ]
1  
1  
h + (1  )
Z 1
h
hdF (h)

wt+1
+
(1 + n) (1 + )
(1  )
 (h)w
1

t+1: (30)
We can conrm that the dynamic system given by (30) has a unique steady-state value
of wt and that it satises global stability.
Proposition 3 There is a unique steady-state equilibrium that is globally stable.
Proof. Let us express  (wt+1) given by (30) as
 (wt+1) =
B1wt+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
+B3w
1

t+1; (31)
where
B1 =
1
(1  )

[(1  )F (h) + ]
1  
1  
h + (1  )
Z 1
h
hdF (h)

> 0;
B2 = A [(1  )A]
1

 1 > 0;
B3 =
(1 + n) (1 + )
(1  )
 (h) > 0: (32)
Letting the steady-state value of wt be w; it holds that w = (w) : Besides w = 0; from (31) ;
w also satises
1 =
B1
1 +B2w
1  1

+B3w
1

 1: (33)
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Since the right-hand side of the above monotonically increases with w; there is a unique,
positive steady-state level of real wage that establishes(33) :
From (31) ; we nd
0 (wt+1) =
B1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
+

1

  1

B1B2w
1  1

t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2 + 1B3w 1 1t+1 > 0:
Hence,  (wt+1) monotonically increases with wt+1: In addition, from (33) and  2 (0; 1) ; we
obtain
0 (w) = 1 +

1

  1

B3w
1

 1 +

1 
1


B3w
1

 1 +

1

  1

B1B2w
1  1

1 +B2w
1  1

`
2 > 1;
Moreover, It is easy to see that  2 (0; 1) means that  (0) = 0 and 0 (0) = 0: Since  (wt+1)
is invertible, the properties of  (wt+1) function shown so far means that
d
dwt
 1 (wt+1) > 0;
d
dwt
 1 (0) = +1; and 0 <  1 (w) < 1: As a consequence, the phase diagram of wt+1 =
 1 (wt) can be depicted as Figure 2, meaning that the wt converges to w for all w0 > 0:
[Figure 2]
4 Retirement Decision and Capital Accumulation
4.1 Steady-State Characterization
In the steady state, kt and wt stay constant over time. From (28) and (29) ; the steady-state
conditions are summarized as the following:
k = (h)w
1
 ; (34)
k =
w
(1 + n) (1 + )

(1  )  
 (h)
1
1 +R (w)

; (35)
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where
 (h) =
(
1 + [1  F (ht )]
Z 1
ht
hdF (h)

1 + n
)
[(1  )A] 
1
 ; (36)

 (h) = [(1  )F (h) + ]
1  
1  
h + (1  )
Z 1
h
hdF (h) : (37)
In the above, k and w, respectively, denote the steady-state values of kt and wt: As mentioned
before, (34) is the technological relationship between the capital stock per mass of the young
generation and the real wage rate. A change in the labor force participation of the elderly
changes the level of  (h) : Equation (35) expresses the per capita saving of the young
generation, which is positively related to the young agents after-tax income, (1  )w; and
negatively related to the per-capita consumption in their old age. Noting that 0 <  < 1,
limw!0R (w) = +1, and limw!+1R (w) = 0; we see that the graphs of (34) and (35) are
depicted as in Figure 3.
[Figure 3]
Once k and w are xed, the steady-state values of the key variables are determined in the
following manner. The per capita level of income in the steady state is
AKt L
1 
t
Nt + Nt 1
= A

1 + n
1 + n+ 

k
8<
:
"
1 + (1  F (ht ))
Z 1
ht
+hdF (h)

1 + n
#1 9=
; : (38)
Additionally, the rate of return to capital and per capita pension are, Respectively, given by
r = R (w) = A [(1  )A]
1

 1w1 
1
 : (39)
4.2 Comparative Statics in the Long-Run
Using the steady-state conditions derived above, we conduct some comparative statics in the
long-run equilibrium.
(i) Population Aging
As mentioned earlier, in our setting, population aging means a fall in the population
expansion rate, n; and/or a rise in the survival rate, : Other things being equal, either if n
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decreases or if  rises, then h declines, which increases the value of  (h) in (36) : Hence,
the graph of (34) shifts upward. Namely, a rise in the labor force participation elderly driven
by population aging makes rms select a higher level of capital under a given level of the real
wage. We also nd a fall in h decreases the rst and the second terms in the right-hand
side of 
 (h) dened by (37) ; while it increases the third term. If the former negative e¤ects
dominate the positive third e¤ect, then 
 (h) decreases so that the graph of (10) shifts
upward. In this case, the steady-state level of kt rises: see Figure 4. Otherwise, the graph of
(35) shifts downward, and thus the e¤ect on k becomes analytically ambiguous
Concerning the impact of population aging on per capita real income given by (38), a
decline in n or a rise in  leads to three e¤ectsthe two indirect e¤ects that are represented
by an increase in k and a decrease in h; these impacts positively a¤ect the per capita income
in the steady state. The direct e¤ect expressed by terms

1+n
1+n+

and


1+n
1 
will be
negative or positive when n decreases or  increases. Since the total impact depends on the
relative strength of those three e¤ects, the e¤ect of population aging on the steady-state level
of per capita income is, again, analytically ambiguous.
[Figure 4]
(ii) Pension Reforms
We have conrmed that if the scal authority raises the rate of payroll tax, ; then h will
increase, leading to a decline in the labor force participation of the elderly. Similarly, a fall
in  and a rise in ; which make the pension for the working elderly less generous, increase
h: To cope with the expansion of public debt, the recent pension reforms implemented in
advanced countries set less favorable pension schemes for the fully retired elderly. As a side
e¤ect, those reforms promote the labor force participation of the elderly. Therefore, in the
context of our model. the recent pension reforms are described by falls in  and  as well as
by a rise in . Since  (h) in (35) is independent of policy variables, a pension reform that
lowers h rises the value of  (h) ; which gives rise to an upward shift of the graph of (35).
On the other hand, as well as in the case of population aging, a pension reform gives both
positive and negative e¤ects on 
 (h) given by (37) : If the negative e¤ects dominate, then
the value of 
 (h) decreases, leading to an upward shift of the graph of (35) : In this case,
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pension reform increases k: Otherwise, the long-run impact of pension reform on k; again,
becomes analytically ambiguous.
(iii) Income Distribution
From (1) ; in the steady state, the relative income a young agent and a retired old agent
is given by
p
w
=
1  
1  
h; (40)
where p denotes the steady-state level of pension for the fully retired old. Since population
aging reduces h; a rise in  or a fall in n widens the income gap between the young agents
and the fully retired elderly. On the other hand, a pension reform conducted by a decrease
in  or an increase in  have two opposite e¤ects on the value of p=w: Equation (40) means
that those policy changes yield a positive, direct e¤ect on p=w as well as an indirect negative
e¤ect through a reduction in h: Thus, the total e¤ect on p=w is not determined analytically.
Similarly, the relative income between the young and the working old with labor e¢ciency
h is given by
p+ (1  )hw
w
=
(1  )
1  
h + (1  )h: (41)
Thus, changes in the relative income generated by a change in n; ; and  are essentially the
same as those in the relative income between the young and the fully retired old. Additionally,
the relative income between a working old with labor e¢ciency, h; and the fully retired old is
p+ (1  )hw
p
= + (1  )
h
h
: (42)
This expression means that a rise in  and a fall in ; which lowers h; widens the income
gap between the working elderly and fully retired elderly. Also, a decrease in  raises the
income gap, while the e¤ect of a fall in  on the income distribution between the working old
and the retired elderly is analytically ambiguous.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
Since manipulating the analytical model does not provide us with further information, we
examine some numerical examples. To conduct a numerical analysis, we assume that the
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cumulative distribution function of h is specied as a truncated Pareto distribution in such
a way that
F (h) =
1 

h

  
1 

1

  ;  > 1; 0 <  < 1 h 2 [; 1] : (43)
Our specication has two merits. First, it has been pointed out that an upper tail of income
distribution among the elderly follows a Pareto distribution. Since the income distribution
among the working elderly depends on the distribution of h; such an empirical nding is well
described if F (h) follows a Pareto distribution11. In addition, the degree of heterogeneity
among the elderly can be represented by the shape parameter,  : Namely, a smaller  means
that the distribution function Pr(h  h) = 1   F (h) has a fatter tail. Given (43) ; the
average labor e¢ciency of the working old is specied as
Z 1
h
hdF (h) =
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
;
which is a decreasing function of h: Hence, the cuto¤ condition (23) is expressed as
ht =

1  
1  

266664


(1 + n) +   
  1
(1  )(  1)
h
(h)1    1
i
(1  )
1 

h

  
1 

1

  + 
377775 : (44)
We rst focus on the cuto¤ condition (44) ; which determines the cuto¤ level of labor
e¢ciency, h that, in turn, determines the labor force participation rate of the elderly, 1 h

1  :
We assume that one period spans across 40 years and  = 0:5; this ensures that the average
lifetime of the old agents is 20 years. We also assume that the baseline population growth
rate is 0.5% per year; this means that 1 + n = (1 + 0:005) 40 t 1: 22; so that we set n = 0:2:
As for the discount factor, ; we assume that the annual time discount rate of the household
is 0:018; which is a conventional value used in the real business cycle models. As a result,
the discount factor over one period is (1 + 0:018) 40 t 0:49; so we set  = 0:5: The baseline
11Concerning the recent study on income distribution among the Japanese elderly, see Shirahase (2015) and
Seiyama (2016).
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values of the other parameters are as follows:
A = 1:0;  = 0:3;  = 1:5;  = 0:125;  = 0:5;  = 0:3;  = 0:2
In this baseline setting, we nd that (44) yields h = 0:325; and thus the equilibrium rate of
labor force participation of the elderly is
L0t
Nt 1
= 1 h

1 0:125 = 0:75:
Keeping the other parameters constant, we change one of the key parameters to see how
the cuto¤ level e¢ciency, h, and the labor participation rate of the elderly respond to such
a change. Figures 5 and 6 summarize the outcomes. Figure 5 depicts the linkage between
population aging and the retirement decision of the elderly. Panel (a) shows the relationship
between the probability of surviving, ; and the cuto¤ level, h under alternative levels
of  = 1:2; 1:5; and 3:0: Panel (b) depicts the relationships between h and n: Similarly,
Panels (c) and (d) describe the relationship between population aging and the labor force
participation rate of the elderly. As was expected from the theoretical analysis, population
aging (a rise in  and a fall in n) lowers the cuto¤ level of e¢ciency, so the number of fully
retired elderly decreases and the labor force participation rate of the elderly rises. The graphs
in Figure 5 also reveal that the proles of those linkages are sensitive to the magnitude of
the shape parameter,  : under given levels of  and n; the labor force participation rate of
the elderly becomes higher as  increases. Since the magnitude of  represents the degree of
homogeneity of the elderly, the graphs reveal that other things being equal, the labor force
participation rate is higher in the economy in which the old agents are less heterogeneous in
their labor e¢ciency.
[Figure 5]
Figure 6 shows the impacts of changes in the policy parameters on the cuto¤ e¢ciency
and the labor force participation rate of the elderly. As we have conrmed analytically, less
generous pension reforms for the fully retired elderly, that is, decrease in  and ; as well as
a rise in ; reduce h; so that the labor force participation of the elderly increases. Again,
the proles of those relationships are sensitive to the level of  :
[Figure 6]
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Figure 7 shows the impacts of population aging and changes in the policy parameters on
the steady-state level of kt(= Kt=Nt): As discussed in the previous subsection, the long-run
e¤ects of those factors are analytically ambiguous: a positive e¤ect of a rise in the total
labor supply on output would be o¤set by a fall in the young agents savings. However, in
our calibration with plausible parameter magnitudes, population aging (a rise in ) and less
benecial pension plans for the retired elderly (decreases in  and ) have positive e¤ects on
the steady state-levels of kt. An exception is the e¤ect of a change in : As the graph shows,
a higher ; which also raises the labor force participation of the elderly, yields a negative
impact on k:In addition, Figure 8 reveals that those impacts on the the steady-state level of
per capita income dened by (38) : Concerning changes in ; ; and ; their e¤ects on the
steady-state level of per capita income are essentially the same as those on the steady-state
value of kt However, a change in  now has a negative long-run e¤ect on the per capita
income.
[Figure 7] ; [Figure 8]
Finally, Figure 9 depicts the e¤ects of population aging and changes in key policy parameters
on the relative income between a young agent and a fully retired old agent. As to the e¤ects
of a changes in  and ; the graphs displayed in Figure 9 conrm our analytical argument.
However, in our setting, the relationship between p=w and  exhibits a hump-shaped prole.
Moreover, a rise in ; which also reduces h; decreases p=w; so that the income gap between
the young and the retired old becomes larger as the labor force participation of the elderly
increases.
[Figure 9]
5 Conclusion
In general, the heterogeneity among the elderly is wider than that among the young people. In
particular, individual di¤erences in health status and motivation for labor force participation
are more prominent among the elderly than among the young. This study relies on this simple
fact to determine the retirement decision of the elderly and thereby their aggregate labor
supply. In our model, the heterogeneity among the elderly is represented by a distribution
function of their labor e¢ciency. We have shown that the aggregate level of labor force
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participation of the elderly is determined by pension schemes, the level of population aging,
and the prole of the distribution of labor e¢ciency among the elderly. The analytical results
reveal that both population aging and less favorable pension reform decrease the fraction of
elderly who select full retirement from the labor force. Those outcomes t well with the
recent experiences in advanced countries. We have also investigated how changes in the
pension scheme and the level of population aging a¤ects the long-run performance of the
aggregate economy. Our model shows that population aging and a decline in the payroll tax
levied on the young generation promote labor force participation of the old generation, which
increases the aggregate labor supply. While a higher labor supply enhances production and
investment, a higher income of the elderly increases their consumption, which has a negative
e¤ect on capital accumulation. The long-run e¤ect of a rise in labor supply of the elderly
on economic growth hinges upon the relative strengths of these opposing e¤ects generated
by a change in the labor force participation of the elderly. To investigate the net e¤ect of a
change in the elderlys labor supply on the long-term growth, we examined some numerical
examples. Our numerical experiment demonstrates that an increase in the elderlys labor
force participation enhances capital accumulation.
To obtain clear analytical outcomes, we have set some restrictive assumptions. Partic-
ularly, we have assumed that payroll taxes levied on the young generation is proportional
to their wage income and that all the tax revenue of the government to expenditure for the
pension. Due to these restrictions, the aggregate labor participation rate of the elderly stays
constant during the transition process of the economy. If we assume an alternative pension
scheme in which the per capita level of pension is xed, then it can be shown that the thresh-
old level of labor e¢ciency, ht ; does not stay constant over time, leading to more complex
aggregate dynamics than that treated in this study. Similarly, if we assume that the tax
revenue of the government is spent for other purposes, in addition to pension, then the cuto¤
level, ht ; will change over time. Such an extension, again, requires us to treat a more com-
plex dynamic analysis. This means that we should heavily rely on numerical considerations
rather than analytical arguments. Finally, since we use the neoclassical growth framework,
the per capita income stays constant in the steady-state equilibrium. It would be interesting
to introduce our setting into an endogenous growth model in which a persisting increase of
the per capita income is allowed.
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Figure 6: The effects of changes in the policy parameters
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Figure 7: 'The relationships between the key parameters and thesteady-state value of  the  capital per young agents
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Figure 8: The relationships between the key parameters and
                the steady-state value of the per capita income            
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Figure 9: The relationships between the key parameters and the relative income               between a young agent and a retiered old agent 
